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This brief summarises the lessons learned from a systematic literature review that explored the feasibility of 
adopting a behavioural approach to address petty corruption. The findings point to the importance of 
developing messages that challenge conventional wisdom about the inevitability of corruption, emphasizing 
the costs of corruption to the welfare of individuals as well as showcasing examples of successful detection 
and punishment of crimes of corruption. Accounting for prevailing social norms and beliefs is also key 
because otherwise anti-corruption interventions may disseminate concepts and promote actions that fail to 
deliver the desired messages to their intended beneficiaries.
 
Introduction 
Combatting corruption in the developing world has been a 
formidable challenge and taken a prominent place in the 
agenda of the international development community for 
at least the last two decades. Nonetheless, the results 
and outcomes of conventional anti-corruption 
interventions continue to be modest at best. 
Behavioural studies present a promising - but the most 
part unexplored - approach to improve development 
policies by incorporating a better understanding of how 
individuals make choices in their everyday lives. Contrary 
to the assumptions that underpin conventional anti-
corruption strategies, what distinguishes a behavioural 
perspective is the recognition that people often make 
decisions without taking into account formal (legal, 
administrative) incentives, but rather rely on factors such 
as in-built mental shortcuts, default solutions to problems 
and social and cultural expectations of acceptability.  
For those reasons, the UK Department for International 
Development (DFID) through its East Africa Research 
Fund (EARF) has commissioned the Basel Institute on 
Governance to conduct research exploring the utility of a 
behavioural approach to bolster the fight against petty 
corruption.1 This policy brief extracts the main findings 
                                                      
1 For more information about the EARF and the research project “Corruption, 
Social Norms and Behaviours in East Africa” please visit 
and lessons learned from a systematic literature review 
undertaken within the scope of the aforementioned 
research. The review, which followed the conceptual 
framework laid out by the 2015 World Development 
Report (see Box 1), is meant to contribute evidence 
concerning the feasibility of developing of anti-corruption 
interventions based on behavioural principles. The review 
addressed two main questions: 
1. What behavioural factors having an impact on attitudes 
towards petty corruption have been identified in the 
literature? 
2. What does the evidence suggest about the relative 
effectiveness of different types of interventions to 
address petty corruption? 
Main Findings 
The literature review reveals strong evidence that 
behavioural factors can play a significant role in fuelling 
and perpetuating corrupt practices.  
Overall, significant behavioural impacts are associated 
with the prevalence of mental models and narrow frames2  
                                                                                              
http://www.earesearchfund.org/ and 
http://www.earesearchfund.org/research-corruption-social-norms-and-
behaviors-east-africa. 
2 Narrow frames refer to the reference to which the automatic system of the 
mind refers to evaluate a situation or that which “automatically comes to mind” 
World Bank (2015, p. 6). 
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that support the idea that corruption is the normal state 
of affairs and that normalise expectations about deficient 
provision and quality of public services. Such beliefs can 
have a powerful influence over what societies collectively 
view as expected and acceptable behaviours of citizens 
and public officials alike, often legitimising a tacit 
tolerance - and even acceptance - of corrupt actions.  
 
Furthermore, the review confirms that interventions 
raising awareness about the incidence of corrupt 
behaviours seem to lack effectiveness in such contexts 
where high corruption is perceived to be the norm. 
Campaigns focusing on the prevalence of bribing or 
perceptions about corruption levels seem to not only fail 
to provide any new information but run the risk of 
reinforcing the notion that everyone is corrupt. 
However, the reviewed experiences with different anti-
corruption approaches do suggest that, even in highly 
corrupt contexts, citizens can go from passive 
acceptance to active engagement against corrupt 
practices when they are empowered with the right kind of 
information. In this regard, the type of information that 
appears to have the greatest impact is that which, not 
only conveys a strong message about the costs of 
corruption, but also throws into question the beliefs 
associated with corruption as the norm. 
Examples of effective information include benchmark data 
on performance of local public services (comparing 
outcomes across facilities and in relation to the national 
average) and information on budget allocations to local 
schools and health facilities. Exposure to this type of data 
enables users to assess whether the quality of services 
they receive conforms to what should be expected on the 
basis of the performance standards prevailing in their 
country as well as resource availability. Furthermore, such 
information helps users make a stronger association 
between corruption, deficient public services and 
negative impacts on their own welfare, thus challenging 
prevailing mental models and providing concrete 
incentives to denounce and condemn corrupt behaviours. 
Positive results were also recorded in interventions that 
stressed messages about the importance of enjoying 
access to high quality public services. Such information 
not only reminds citizens about the value of education 
and health for promoting their families’ wellbeing, but also 
underscores that corruption is not harmless. 
Information is also an essential component to enhance 
the effectiveness of social accountability activities, 
especially when it promotes ownership and direct control 
by citizens. It is indicative that the most successful social 
accountability interventions in the review provided 
participants with information that empowered them to 
identify concrete instances of resource capture, 
mismanagement and underperformance. In fact, the 
evidence demonstrates that bottom-up monitoring by 
citizens can promote important effects on anti-corruption 
outcomes, which in turn suggests that promoting 
practical tools in conjunction with actionable information 
can help overcome mental models of apathy and 
helplessness. 
The literature shows that individuals that engage in 
corrupt actions tend to systematically underestimate the 
probability of being caught, which is reinforced in 
contexts where there is a widely held perception of 
impunity for crimes of corruption. In this regard, the 
evidence points to the critical role of information for 
deterrence purposes. In several of the successful 
interventions reviewed, a key factor was to make the 
threat of detection and punishment more likely and 
credible. In fact, success was associated with actions 
that altered perceptions by effectively conveying 
messages about stronger monitoring, regardless of 
whether the oversight mechanisms improved or not.  
 
Other review findings reveal the importance of adequately 
accounting for the social context when developing anti-
corruption approaches. Several of the interventions 
assessed demonstrate that significant social cleavages 
generate risks of elite capture of anti-corruption social 
accountability interventions. Thus, when local power 
Box 1: WDR Framework 
• "Thinking automatically" refers to the propensity of people to make 
most judgements and choices automatically, rather than delibaretly. 
• "Thinking socially" recognises that the way in which people act and 
think often depends on what others around them do and think. 
• "Thinking with mental models" means that individuals in any given 
society share common perspetives and ideas - such as stereotypes 
and prejudices - through which they make sense of the world around 
them. 
Key messages 
• The literature provides compelling evidence about the role played by 
behavioural factors in shaping attitudes that fuel and perpetuate 
corruption.  
• The encouraging news is that, although the identified social patterns 
and practices may be entrenched, they are not necessarily immutable.  
• Individuals - citizens and public officials alike – while influenced in their 
choices by behavioural factors, are nonetheless also acutely pragmatic 
and will respond to stimuli they find useful, credible and beneficial.  
• Anti-corruption programming should strive to incorporate the 
perspective of its intended beneficiaries: what are the outcomes that 
they value most, what are the mental models influencing their 
attitudes, and what are socially accepted behaviours in their 
respective communities. 
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asymmetries are pronounced, even well meaning anti-
corruption initiatives may be taken advantage of by 
powerful local groups, which not only reinforces and 
perpetuates patterns of social domination and exclusion, 
but can also fuel higher levels of ‘decentralised 
corruption’. 
The literature also illustrates how certain social norms –
such as gift giving and reciprocal exchange of favours - 
may not align well with concepts that are fundamental to 
the good governance paradigm, such as a clear 
distinction between public and private spheres and the 
importance of certain rights and obligations of citizens 
and public officials. In this regard, the review alerts about 
the importance of informal social networks, which may be 
constituted along several different criteria such as family, 
clan, village, friendship, or professional association.  
Such networks are typically bound together by ties of 
solidarity and reciprocity, and rely upon a strong sense of 
obligation towards the group. In contrast to abstract 
rights and laws that are not enforced (and often lack 
legitimacy), informal social networks are highly valued 
because they represent effective mechanisms for pooling 
resources, solving problems and addressing people’s 
needs.  
Because of that functionality, the literature shows that (in 
Africa as well as in other regions) obligations towards the 
informal networks play an important role in defining social 
status and reputation and therefore tend to prevail when 
pitted against the formal rules of the state. As a 
consequence, the expectations from the informal groups - 
whereby a member holding a position of public office 
should do everything within his or her means to cater to 
the needs of the group - can fuel the incidence of corrupt 
actions.  
There are significant implications for anti-corruption 
stemming from these aspects of sociality. For instance, 
the preponderance of informal allegiances over formal 
duties is most certainly linked to the prevalence and 
entrenched nature of the practices of clientelism and 
political patronage found across developing countries. 
Significantly, in the review, all interventions that targeted 
political corruption failed to substantially lower support 
for practices of vote buying and gift giving. This might 
have been because appeals to the duties of citizenship 
and voting in “good conscience” have limited value 
compared to the functionality of informal networks. 
Rather, from the perspective of the recipients of a 
patronage “gift”, what is clear is that they receive a short-
term, concrete and measureable benefit whereas the 
longer-term (and uncertain) benefit from rejecting such 
gifts is much less obvious. 
This document in an output from a project funded by the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID) through the Research for Evidence Division 
(RED) for the benefit of developing countries. However, the views expressed 
and information contained in it are not necessarily those of or endorsed by 
DFID, which can accept no responsibility for such views or information or for 
any reliance placed on them.  
The Basel Institute on Governance is an Associated Institute of the University 
of Basel. 
Lessons for Practitioners 
• Anti-corruption interventions must convey clear messages that have an
impact on the incentives of citizens (better public services) and public 
officials (increased risk of detection and punishment).
• Exposure to ideas that challenge conventional wisdom appears to work 
best.
• Evidence linking corruption to underperformance of public services may
be more effective than information about incidence of corruption. 
• Highlighting topics such as frequency of audits, expenditure tracking
monitoring, or cases of corruption successfully prosecuted can
credibly increase the perceived likelihood of detection and punishment
of corrupt acts.
• Caution should be exercised in rolling out social accountability
interventions in communities where social cleavages are deeply
entrenched because of a high risk of capture by powerful local actors
• Targeting political corruption effectively requires a substantial effort to 
compellingly demonstrate the negative links of patronage and 
associated practices with the welfare of individuals.
• Refining an effective anti corruption message that will be meaningful 
and appealing to the intended beneficiaries of anti corruption 
campaigns may require several trials. Practitioners should be ready to 
experiment and test different approaches to find that to which the
target population is most responsive.
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